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Abstract
The Market Information Service project in Uganda collected data on prices for the main
agricultural commodities inmajormarket centres and disseminated the information through
local FM radio stations in various districts. Exploiting the variation across space between
households with and without access to a radio, we find evidence suggesting that better-
informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm-gate prices on their surplus produc-
tion. (JEL: O12, D82, D83)
1. Introduction
The importance of information for the effective functioning of markets has been
a central concern of economic theory, going back at least to the seminal work
of Stigler (1961). However, lack of information, or situations of asymmetric
information, is rather the norm in most developing countries. Therefore, it is
surprising that there are so few empirical studies based on data from developing
countries assessing the effects of improvements in information on market out-
comes.1 Specifically, we know little about what the impact of improving access
to market information is on farmers’ choice of what to produce, how much to
sell, where to sell, and the prices farmers receive for their output.
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1. Notable exceptions are Jensen (2007) and Aker (2008). There is an extensive literature on the
effects of increased market information due to information technology diffusion in rich countries,
e.g., Baye and Morgan (2001), Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004), Brown and Goolsbee (2002) and
Ellison and Ellison (2005).
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This paper exploits a “natural” experiment—the Market Information Service
(MIS) project in Uganda—to assess the impact of asymmetric information about
market prices on the price farmers receive for their crops (i.e. farm-gate prices).
We focus on maize, which is the most important cereal crop in Uganda. The
MIS project collected weekly data on district market prices for different agri-
cultural commodities, and disseminated the information through local FM radio
stations in the participating districts. The presumption was that the provision of
accurate, timely, and appropriate market information to farmers through radio
transmissions would improve their ability to bargain for higher prices with local
traders. To identify the effects of market information, we exploit the differences-
in-differences between MIS project districts and districts where the project was
not implemented, and across households with and without access to a radio. We
show that access tomarket information is associatedwith higher farm-gate prices,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that market information improves farm-
ers’ relative bargaining position vis-à-vis local traders.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to estimate the impact of
asymmetric information between farmers and traders on farm-gate prices in a de-
veloping country setting. It relates to a small literature on the effects of increased
market information on market outcomes. Jensen (2007) evaluates the effects of
the introduction of mobile phones in the fishing industry in Kerala, India. He
finds that by improving fishermen’s and traders’ access to market information,
the introduction of mobile phones improved arbitrage opportunities and resulted
in reduced waste and price dispersion across geographic markets.2 In this paper,
we focus on the distributional aspects, namely the effects on farm-gate prices of
increasing access to market information for farmers in a context that is typical
for small-scale farmers in sub-Saharan Africa; i.e. where farmers are engaged in
the market through local traders that are relatively well-informed.
General lessons from contract theory show that asymmetric information can
have both redistributional and efficiency implications.3 As concerns the former,
if the trader has knowledge about the market price and the farmer must sell to
the trader or consume her output, the trader has strong incentives to misreport the
market price in order to get a more favorable deal. Realizing this, the farmer may
agree to give the trader higher rents if the trader reports a high price; i.e., accept
a relatively lower farm-gate price, and low rents when the trader reports a low
price. As the farmer becomes better informed, the “contract” will require lower
incentives and hence the farmerwill, on average, get a higher farm-gate price (less
rents to the trader). On the issue of efficiency, such a contract would typically
involve trading off redistribution with allocative efficiency (see Svensson and
2. Aker (2008) finds similar effects on price dispersions across grain markets when mobile phones
were introduced in Niger.
3. See, for example, Mirrlees (1971) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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Yanagizawa 2008). Lack of information about the market price also implies that
farmers may choose a sub-optimal composition of goods to produce (and sell);
i.e., where relative prices are not equal to the marginal rate of transformation.
As shown in Jensen (2007), to the extent that farmers sell directly on the market,
asymmetric information can result in large price differences across geographical
markets as the possibilities for arbitrage are more limited.
This paper also relates to the ongoing discussion about the role of informa-
tion and communication technologies (ICTs) for economic development. In par-
ticular, it suggests that information dissemination through FM radio may be a
powerful tool to increase both efficiency and relative incomes of the poor. Living
standards for most of the world’s poorest are largely determined by how much
they get paid for their agricultural output. Therefore, the functioning of output
markets, including marketing and distribution channels, is central for the income
of households engaged in agriculture in low-income countries. In most devel-
oping countries, however, markets are dispersed and the infrastructure is poor.
Small-scale producers typically lack information on market prices, so the poten-
tial for inefficiency in the allocation of goods across markets, and the allocation
between consumption and trading, is large. Moreover, asymmetric information
between sellers (i.e. poor small-scale farmers) and buyers adds important distri-
butional concerns. Improving access to information, for example through the use
of FM radio, may help poorly functioning markets work better, improve farmers’
bargaining position vis-à-vis wholesalers or middlemen and thereby, in the end,
increase the incomes of the poor.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the insti-
tutional setup. Section 3 briefly describes theMarket Information Service project.
Section 4 discusses the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 examines the
effects of market information on farm-gate prices. Section 6 conducts robustness
checks and Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional setup and Ugandan maize markets
Maize is a widely grown and consumed cereal crop in Uganda. It covers about
46% of all cereal-growing land, contributing about 16% of the total cash and
food crop contribution to Uganda’s GDP. It is estimated that maize provides over
40% of the calories consumed in both rural and urban areas. About 95% of the
households engaged in maize production are small-scale farmers, contributing
over 75% of the marketable surplus of maize, with land holdings of 0.2-0.5ha.
Medium scale commercial farmerswith 0.8-2.0haof land undermaize production
contribute the remaining 25% (RATES Center 2003).
Small-scale subsistence farmers sell off most of their surplus maize to rural
traders immediately after harvest due to limited storage facilities and alternative
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Figure 1. Weekly district market prices of maize in Ush in Kasese, July 2004 to June
2005
income generating enterprises. Rural traders, who operate in the villages, con-
stitute over 90% of the total number of maize traders and handle two-thirds of
all traded maize. Typically, traders traverse villages on bicycles and pick-ups
procuring maize at farm-gate prices on a cash basis. Traders either work inde-
pendently or as agents of larger urban traders. Since traders travel back-and-forth
to the market, while farmers seldom sell their output on the main district markets,
sellers generally have less or little information about current prices while buyers
are often well-informed, at least about the price in the district market where they
are active (RATES Center 2003).
Prices on most cash- and foodcrops vary greatly in district markets in Uganda
over time. To illustrate this, Figure 1 depicts the weekly market price for maize
in the main market in the district of Kasese (the coefficient of variation over time
is 0.24). Given these price variations, it is not surprising that farmers in Uganda
view getting market information as one of their highest priorities (Ferris 2004).
Prices also vary greatly across locations. Figure 2 plots the market price of
maize at the beginning of December 2004 (the coefficient of variation across
district markets is 0.30). The information is drawn from the main markets in
the 21 districts where the MIS project was implemented. The variation in prices
across districts at a given point in time suggests that to the extent that farmers
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Figure 2. District market prices of maize in USh, 12 December 2004
sell their output to traders located in their own district, the market price in that
district, rather than the average price in the country, is the key statistic.
3. The Market Information Service
In 2000, the Market Information Service project was initiated by two agricultural
research organizations (IITA and ASARECA) in association with the Ministry of
Trade, Tourism and Industry in Uganda. The starting point of the project was sur-
vey data indicating that most farmers had little idea of the current market prices
in the main district market centres, and little knowledge of price movements and
market trends. By providing accurate, timely, and appropriate information, the
assumption was that small-scale farmers would be able to make better decisions
about what to produce and where to sell their output. Timely and accurate in-
formation would also improve farmers’ bargaining position vis-à-vis local and
regional traders.
Starting in April 2000, the Market Information Service project was imple-
mented in 21 districts in Uganda.4 The project collected data, on a weekly basis,
4. The total number of districts in 2004 was 56. Not all districts could be included in the MIS project
because of budget and administrative reasons. One of the main reasons for participation was USAID
presence in the district. USAID—the donor funding the project—wanted to include districts in which
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on market prices for 19 different agricultural commodities, including maize, in
the main market centre in each MIS district.
The information was processed and disseminated through various radio sta-
tions in each MIS district. Each week, a 15-minute radio program was broad-
casted and each day, a 2-4 minute news bulletin was broadcasted in altogether
eight local languages. The main focus of the radio shows was to provide updates
on district market prices. The radio stations used for dissemination were typi-
cally popular ones and in 2004 theMIS was estimated to reach seven of Uganda’s
twenty-four million people each week (Ferris 2004).5
4. Data and identification
To assess the effects of improved access to market information on farm-gate
prices, we use data from the Uganda National Household Survey 2005 (UNHS
2005). The UNHS 2005 includes a full crop module, enabling us to calculate
farm-gate prices for maize. We combine this data with information from the
MIS project, so as to identify which households reside in districts where the MIS
project assembled and disseminated district market information.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The average farm-gate price
per kilogram of maize, over the period July 2004-June 2005, was 188 Uganda
Shillings (USh) or approximately US$ 0.11, while the average district market
price in the MIS districts over the same period was USh 291. On average, farm-
ers sell somewhat more than half of what they produce and almost exclusively
sell to a local trader.
To identify the effect of themarket information service, we exploit two sources
of variation. First, we have information on farm-gate prices for households with
and without access to a radio. Second, we have household data from MIS dis-
tricts and districts whereMIS did not collect and disseminatemarket information.
While both access to a radio and geographical location may be correlated with
other important variables determining farm-gate prices, the key identification as-
sumption made is that the combination of the two is not.
The differences-in-differences specification used is thus
pi j = α + Β1radioi j + Β2radioi j ×MIS j + Β3xi j + μ j + εi j (1)
where pi j is the farm-gate price per kilogram of maize sold by household i in
district j, radioi j is a binary variable indicating whether household i in district j
they were operating.
5. The MIS project initially bought air-time from the radio stations for the radio program. Inter-
estingly, because of the popularity of the program among farmers, several commercial radio stations
started to transmit the programs without public funds.
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has access to a radio, MIS j is a binary variable indicating whether district j is an
MIS district, xi j is a set of household-specific controls, μ j is a district fixed effect
and εi j is an error term. The coefficient of interest is Β2, i.e. the differences-in-
differences estimate.6
5. Effect of market information on farm-gate prices
Table 2 presents some preliminary evidence of the impact of market information
on the farm-gate prices of maize. We start by estimating the difference in price
between households with and without access to a radio. The coefficient estimate,
reported in column (i), is positive and significantly different from zero at the 5%
level, providing some, albeit weak, evidence in support of the argument that the
provision of market information improves farmers’ bargaining position. How-
ever, since households with access to a radio may systematically differ (apart
from having a radio) from households without access to a radio, and since the
Market Information Service did not disseminate information on market prices in
roughly two-thirds of the districts included in the sample, the estimate cannot
be viewed as the causal effect of better information about market outcomes on
farm-gate prices.
In columns (ii) and (iii), we split the sample into a MIS sample (i.e., includ-
ing all households residing in districts where the MIS project was implemented)
and a non-MIS sample. Assuming that the factors that determine radio access are
the same in MIS and non-MIS districts relative to the district mean and condi-
tional on observable household characteristics, we can examine the plausibility
of market information as the key mechanism for the result reported in column (i)
by comparing outcomes across these two samples.7
In districts where the market information system was active, column (ii), the
difference estimate is positive and precisely estimated. The effect is also eco-
nomically important. Having access to regular market information, here proxied
by having access to a radio, is associated with a 15% higher farm-gate price. In
the non-MIS areas, however, the estimated effect is close to zero and insignifi-
cant. That is, having access to a radio in districts where market information was
not disseminated is not associated with higher farm-gate prices, but having ac-
6. The control variables in xi j are household size, a measure of educational achievement of the
household (highest level of education of the head of the household), and a measure of the health
status of the household (share of household members that reported suffering from an illness during
the 30 days prior to the survey date). All results below are robust to the exclusion of these household
controls.
7. The share of households with access to a radio is the same in MIS and non-MIS districts (approx-
imately 60% in 2005). Preliminary evidence also indicates that the change over time in the share of
households with access to a radio is the same (Svensson and Yanagizawa 2008).
Svensson and Yanagizawa Getting Prices Right 8
cess to a radio in districts where the MIS project was operative is associated with
significantly higher farm-gate prices.
Estimates based on equation (1) are given in column (iv). The differences-
in-differences estimate is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1%
level. If our key identification assumption holds, this can be viewed as the causal
effect of having information about market outcomes on farm-gate prices. The
point estimate is similar to the difference estimate reported in column (ii).
One concern with the results reported in Table 2 is spillovers. If households
without access to a radio in MIS districts learnt about market prices from in-
formed households, the difference in outcomes between households with and
without access to a radio would be smaller. This would thus work against finding
an effect. In column (v) we provide evidence suggesting spillovers to be less of a
concern.8 Specifically, we restrict the attention to households without access to a
radio and compare households in MIS and non-MIS districts. The point estimate
is positive (consistent with spillovers being present) but we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no effect.
Another concern is spillovers across districts. Since the radio stations broad-
castingmarket information inMIS districts could be reached by some households
residing in neighboring non-MIS districts (and some households in MIS districts
could most likely not get the signal), also some non-MIS households received
market information. To the extent that these farmers sold their output to traders
mainly active in their own district, this information would typically be of less in-
terest, given the large variation in prices across districts at a given point in time, as
illustrated in Figure 2. Moreover, even if having access to information about the
market price in district x would help the farmer predict the market price in his/her
district y, this effect would work against finding an effect of the market informa-
tion system. In that respect, the point estimate in column (iv) could be viewed
as providing the lower bound on the effect. If farmers in neighboring non-MIS
districts sold their output to traders mainly active in MIS districts, we would also
underestimate the effect of the market information system on farm-gate prices.
6. Robustness
While both access to a radio and geographical location may be correlated with
other determinants of farm-gate prices, the key identification assumptionwemake
is that the combination of the two is not. We conduct two robustness checks in
order to assess this assumption. If MIS districts were chosen such that the project
reached householdswith a radio that had particularly high crop incomes (and thus
8. This is consistent with the results on learning about technology adoption in agriculture reported
in Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2006).
Svensson and Yanagizawa Getting Prices Right 9
higher incomes), then differences-in-differences estimates would be biased up-
wards. We use consumption expenditures data from the 1999 Ugandan National
Household Survey, i.e. shortly before the MIS project was implemented, to test
for these selection problems. First, in Table 3 columns (i)-(ii), we test whether
average incomes in MIS districts are different from average incomes in non-MIS
districts in 1999. We find no significant difference. Second, if the identification
assumption is correct, the differences-in-differences estimate should be zero in
the absence of the Market Information Service. Therefore, we estimate equation
1, with the monthly consumption expenditure in USD per household member
equivalent in 1999 as the dependent variable, in columns (iii)-(iv). The point
estimate on the interaction term is small, and in fact even negative, and we can-
not reject the null hypothesis that the differences-in-differences estimate is zero.
That is, while radio owners have higher (farm) income, the difference in (farm)
income between households with and without access to a radio is not systemat-
ically different in MIS districts, as compared to non-MIS districts, prior to the
initiation of the project.
7. Concluding remarks
The issue of information is central to economic theory. However, lack of informa-
tion or situations of asymmetric information ismore the norm inmany developing
countries. In this paper, we have exploited a natural experiment in Uganda—“the
Market Information Service Project”—to assess the effects of improved access
to market information. We found that access to market information resulted in
higher farm-gate prices, a result consistent with the hypothesis that market in-
formation improves farmers’ relative bargaining position vis-à-vis local traders.
The result is also consistent with qualitative evidence based on interviews with
farmers in MIS districts.9
Asymmetric information may not only affect redistribution between traders
and farmers but also production decisions. How to boost agricultural production
in developing countries has been an ongoing policy and research question. The
question is of particular importance for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, where
the growth in agricultural yield has been stagnant.
The important policy and research question that remains to be understood is
therefore to what extent dissemination of market information can improve effi-
ciency and production decisions. In future research we plan to expand the anal-
ysis to assess such aspects (Svensson and Yanagizawa 2008).
9. Farmers claim that access to market information increased their ability to bargain for better prices
and that as a result farm-gate prices have increased by between 5–15 % (Ferris et. al. 2006; Ferris
2004).
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 TABLE 1. Summary statistics 
 Mean Median St. dev. Obs 
Farm gate price (per kg) of maize  187.8 183.3 80.1 2761 
Market price (per kg) of maize  291.0 280.0 67.1 1092 
Sell to traders 0.78 1 0.42 2761 
Radio 0.61 1 0.46 2761 
Notes: “Farm gate price” is the reported value of maize sold in Ugandan shillings divided by 
kilograms sold for the sample period July 2004-June 2005. “Sell to trader” is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the maize was sold to a local private trader. “Radio” is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household owns a radio (Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics National 
Household Survey 2004/05). “Market price” is the weekly maize grain price in each MIS district 
over the same sample period (Source: Foodnet Market Information Service). 
 
 
TABLE 2. Effects of market information on price farmers' receive 
Specification (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Dep. Variable Farm gate price per kilogram of maize 
Sample All MIS No-MIS All No radio 
Radio 12.6
***
 28.6
***
 1.12 2.86  
 (4.00) (5.35) (4.11) (3.52)  
RadioMIS    23.3***  
    (7.23)  
MIS     5.91 
     (12.9) 
Constant 172.8
***
 189.4
***
 160.3
***
 172.5
***
 177.8
***
 
 (5.48) (8.85) (6.92) (5.93) (13.2) 
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Districts 53 17 36 53 53 
Observations 2739 1164 1575 2739 810 
Notes: Robust standard errors, columns (ii)-(iii), clustered by district in parenthesis, columns (i), 
(iv), (v). ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
The household controls include household size, a measure of educational achievement of the 
household (highest level of education of the head of the household), and a measure of health status 
of the household (share of household members that reported suffering from an illness during the 30 
days prior to the survey date). 
TABLE 3. Robustness tests: Income pre-market information system 
Specification (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Dep. Variable Average 
Consumption 
expenditures 
Average 
Consumption 
expenditures 
(log) 
Consumption 
expenditures 
Consumption 
expenditures 
(log) 
Radio   23.9
***
 0.54
***
 
   (4.62) (.08) 
RadioMIS   -1.69 -0.08 
   (5.71) (.10) 
MIS 1.52 0.05 -0.69 0.03 
 (5.30) (.11) (3.10) (.10) 
Constant 40.5
***
 3.39
***
 30.1
***
 3.15
***
 
 (3.81) (.08) (2.48) (.08) 
Districts 41 41 41 41 
Observations 41 41 10695 10695 
Notes: Robust standard errors, columns (i)-(ii), clustered by district, columns (iii)-(iv), in 
parenthesis. ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
Dependent variable is monthly consumption expenditure in USD per household member 
equivalent in 1999, averaged by district in columns (i)-(ii) (Source: 1999/2000 Uganda 
National Household Survey). 
